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Abstract
One major drawback of deception detection is its vulnerability to countermeasures, whereby participants wilfully modulate
their physiological or neurophysiological response to critical guilt-determining stimuli. One reason for this vulnerability is
that stimuli are usually presented slowly. This allows enough time to consciously apply countermeasures, once the role of
stimuli is determined. However, by increasing presentation speed, stimuli can be placed on the fringe of awareness,
rendering it hard to perceive those that have not been previously identified, hindering the possibility to employ
countermeasures. We tested an identity deception detector by presenting first names in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation and
instructing participants to lie about their own identity. We also instructed participants to apply a series of countermeasures.
The method proved resilient, remaining effective at detecting deception under all countermeasures.
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Introduction
Lie detection is one of the most emotive and hotly debated of all
human technological endeavours [1–4], with a long, and some
would say chequered [5,6], history. Prominent lie detection
approaches include the standard polygraph [7], which monitors
for ‘signature’ changes in (peripheral) autonomic responses, and
the, cognitively more central, EEG [8,9] and, in the last few years,
fMRI [10] methods. Amongst the applications of these ap-
proaches, detection of identity deception is particularly important
[11].
Although a variety of questioning modes exist (e.g. the Control
Questions Test [12] and the Guilty Knowledge Test [6]), key to all
these approaches is demonstration of a differential response
(physiological, electrophysiological or hemodynamic) to a guilt-
relevant test when compared to a guilt-irrelevant test. (In the
Guilty Knowledge Test, which is our main area of interest, the
former of these is often called the Probe and, the latter, the
Irrelevant.) However, all such methods are confounded or, at least,
significantly complicated by the possibility to apply counter-
measures [4,13–15]. For example, Rosenfeld and colleagues
developed the Complex Trial Protocol, specifically to prevent
countermeasure use. Similarly to previous work [8], their system
used the P3 electroencephalographic response to detect deception
[9]. However, as demonstrated in later studies by the same group,
refined countermeasure strategies allowed that specific deception
detection implementation to be partially confounded [16].
Analysis of reaction times (together with careful selection of the
number of Irrelevants) and ‘‘P9’’ responses has been argued to
discriminate countermeasure users in most cases [14,17]. It would
be desirable, however, to have a deception detection system that
prevents P3 amplitudes from being modulated by countermeasures
in the first place.
Our proposal responds by presenting critical stimuli on the
fringe of awareness, which, we argue, confounds strategies based
upon volitional control. A related strategy, in their case fully
subliminal, was previously demonstrated by Lui and Rosenfeld
[18] (these findings were replicated, somewhat less successfully, in
a study that measured skin conductance instead of EEG [19]). We
consider how our approach differs from Lui and Rosenfeld’s and
their relative success in countering countermeasures in the
discussion. Our approach involves, however, Rapid Serial Visual
Presentation (commonly abbreviated as RSVP), in which stimuli
are presented at the same spatial location at a rapid rate (typically
around 10 per second). Since stimuli ‘mask’ one another, the vast
majority of RSVP items are not consciously identified [20].
However, stimuli that are salient (whether intrinsically or
prescribed by the current task) typically breakthrough into
awareness. That is, it seems that during RSVP, the brain is
searching for stimuli that are cognitively salient, which, when
found, are ‘‘presented’’ to consciousness [21]. We describe the
type of cognitive process performed during RSVP as subliminal
salience search (SSS) [22] and we call the method we propose the
Fringe (or P3-Rapid) identity detector.
Two countermeasure approaches that we tested are, as we call
them, ‘‘Probes as low-salient’’ and ‘‘Irrelevants as high-salient’’.
The former of these involves the suspect dampening down the
measured response when the Probe is presented, while the latter
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involves elevating the response measured, e.g. by imagining the
questioner hitting them, when an Irrelevant is presented.
Importantly, both these countermeasures are reliant upon
artificially counteracting the pre-potent neural and bodily
response. Such counteraction would be expected to depend upon
volitionally applied conscious (cognitive) control.
The method relies upon two particular properties, which we
contend are characteristic of the brain’s capacity to subliminally
search when overloaded with stimulus processing demands.
1. When subliminally searching, we have little volitional control
over breakthrough into conscious awareness. In other words,
during such search, conscious access is ballistic; that is, if the
subconscious brain detects a salient stimulus, volitional
cognitive control cannot ‘‘reach down’’ and stop the
‘‘presentation’’ of that item to the conscious brain.
2. Our perceptual systems are effective at subliminal search for
stimuli that are ‘a priori’ salient to us, but much less so (and
perhaps not at all) for those that are not salient, although
presented frequently.
These two properties map directly onto the proposed counter-
ing of countermeasures. Specifically, we argue that the Probes as
low-salient strategy is precluded by property 1, while Irrelevants as
high-salient is effectively subverted by property 2. The experi-
ments presented here support this position. The key elements,
then, of the Fringe/P3-Rapid identity detector are as follows.
Firstly, we present stimuli in RSVP. Secondly, some RSVP
streams contain the Probe (the suspected own-name) and some an
Irrelevant (a name unknown to the participant, but presented as
frequently as the Probe). Importantly, if the Probe were not the
suspect’s name, it would be an Irrelevant. Consequently, only true
own-name Probes would be differentially processed relative to
Irrelevants, and, thus, break into awareness.
Thirdly, we use EEG to detect perceptual breakthrough.
Specifically, the P3 Event Related Potential (ERP) component
seems only to be present when an RSVP stimulus is consciously
perceived [23–25]. The P3, then, provides a behavioural report-
independent means to determine whether a Probe is perceived
and, thus, is salient, as one’s own-name would surely be.
In our experiments, RSVP streams were sequences of first names,
each containing one critical item, which was either their own name
(the Probe), a name they were asked to pretend was their name (the
Fake) or one of two Irrelevants. (Note, the Fake is effectively the
target prescribed by the participant’s task, and accordingly, in the
literature some do use the term target for what we call the Fake.) We
instructed participants to lie and, accordingly, in response to the end
of stream question, ‘‘Did you see your name?’’, they were told to
answer ‘‘yes’’ when they saw the Fake and ‘‘no’’ in all other cases.
The deception detecting comparison was, then, between the
electrical response to Probe and to Irrelevant.
It is important to note that we are not explicitly observing a
brain response unique to lying. Rather, our proposal is to piggy-
back detection of identity deception upon detection of perceptual
breakthrough, which itself is driven by the brain’s (Fringe
awareness) detection of salience. Thus, effectively, we turn a
perceptual breakthrough detection system (c.f. [22]) into an
identity detection system through choice of stimuli and, particu-
larly, the nature of those stimuli’s deception-coloured salience.
Methods
2.1 Deception Detection Experiment
The experimental setting of the deception detector experiments
presented here is nearly identical to the original Subliminal
Salience Search study [22]. Two differences are present: the delay
between the onset of each stimulus (also called the Stimulus Onset
Asynchrony (SOA)) and the instructions given to participants. We
decreased the SOA between stimuli to 100ms (from the previous
133ms). This increased presentation speed is intended to render
countermeasure use less feasible. We also applied a notch filter
between 8 Hz and 12 Hz to dampen the 10 Hz oscillations evoked
by presenting stimuli every 100ms (in other words, we eliminated,
or at least reduced, most Steady-State Visually Evoked Potentials
elicited by our RSVP streams). For these reasons, we replicated the
previous hit rate and false alarm tests in this study (as experiments
number 1 and 5). We gave additional instructions to participants
in the remaining experiments (2, 3 and 4) in order to assess
countermeasure resilience. These are described in Section 2.1.6.
The underlying method that all the experiments described in this
paper share with the previous study [22] is an identity deception
detector. It can be briefly described as follows.
First names were presented in RSVP trials of 15 items each, one
of which was a critical item, while the remaining 14 were distractors.
One of four critical items could appear within each stream: Probe,
Fake, Irrelevant1 or Irrelevant2. Probes were the concealed informa-
tion (participants’ first names), while Fakes were pretend names
that participants assumed during the experiment. This was chosen
by participants prior to the start of the experiment from a list of 12
possible names, from which they were asked to remove familiar
names. The two Irrelevants were randomly selected from the
remaining names of the list. They appeared as often as Probes and
Fakes over the course of the experiment (50 trials each). The exact
structure of the experiment is discussed in Sections 2.1.1–2.1.8. P3
sizes were calculated using Peak-to-Peak differences (the amplitude
difference between the highest peak of a waveform and the lowest,
where peaks are in fact average amplitudes across short intervals;
for details, see Section 2.1.10). We analysed data from three
electrodes: Fz, Cz and Pz. We calculated P3a size on Fz and Cz
while P3b size was calculated at Pz. Although our use of the term
P3a in relation to the fronto-central oscillations we obtain may
leave some room for debate, we believe this naming is appropriate
(as further justified in the discussion, Section 4.2). We combined
data from these three electrodes (Fz, Cz and Pz) using Fisher’s
method. Deception probability at the individual level was assessed
using a Monte Carlo Permutation Test, also called randomisation,
while at the group-level we employed t-tests. For details of these
methods, see Sections 2.1.9–2.1.12.
2.1.1 Stimulus Presentation. We presented RSVP streams
on a 20’’ LCD screen with a refresh rate of 60 Hz and a resolution
of 160061200, placed at a distance of 60 cm from the participant.
We used custom scripts that employed the Psychophysics toolbox
version 3, running under Matlab 2010a. Stimuli were 16 point,
light grey (75% white; RGB:190,190,190) monospaced, sans-serif
characters presented on a dark (25% white; RGB:64,64,64)
background. As a result, the visual angle for each stimulus was
0.48u in height and 2.48u in width, whereas the whole screen
consisted of a rectangle of 28.52u by 37.56u. The Stimulus Onset
Asynchrony (SOA) was 100ms. Each RSVP trial consisted of a
stream of 15 items, plus a starting and finishing item. The starting
item was XXXXXXX, presented for 800ms, in order to position
participant’s focus on the stimulus presentation area. The finishing
item was either ------- or = = = = = = = , selected at random,
and remaining on screen for 100ms. The response phase began by
Countering Countermeasures
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asking the participant to identify the finishing item. We used this to
keep attention focused on the stream after the critical item (Probe,
Fake or Irrelevant1/2) had been presented, thereby avoiding
muscle artefacts caused by response preparation and initiation
before stream end. Apart from starting and finishing items, all
stimuli were common English proper names with a maximum
length of 7 characters, and first letter capitalised. We padded
shorter names using a randomising algorithm, with ‘#’ or ‘+’
characters blocked on each side of the word (Figure 1). Distractor
names were chosen pseudorandomly: in order to avoid repetition,
names could not contain two or more letters in the same position
as their immediate predecessor. In addition, names which shared
three or more letters in the same position as one of the critical
items were not presented as distractors. We presented all stream
items at the same screen location.
2.1.2 Stimuli. As previously indicated, we call Irrelevant1,
Irrelevant2, Probe or Fake stimuli critical items. These critical items
could be the participant’s real name (Probe), their assumed name
(Fake) or one of two preselected names, unknown to the participant
(Irrelevant1 or Irrelevant2). There were 3 blocks, each consisting of a
random sequence of Irrelevant1, Irrelevant2, Probe and Fake trials. For
each trial type, there were 50 RSVP trials. Each trial of 15 items
contained only one critical item and 14 randomly chosen names as
distractors. The position of the critical item within the stream was
selected pseudorandomly, so that it had equal probability of
appearing in the 5th position (earliest) through to the 10th position
(latest).
We generated a set of possible names from the USA Social
Security Administration database (http://www.ssa.gov/oact/
babynames/). The 1000 top names from four different years
(2009, 1969, 1929 and 1890) were combined into a single set of
unique names. We only kept names shorter than 8 characters,
resulting in a total set size of 3667 names. Prior to the start of the
experiment, we presented participants with a subset of 12 possible
female or male names, depending on their gender, from which
they removed all names of people they knew well. Participants
then chose one of the remaining names as their Fake name. After
each RSVP stream, they were asked, on-screen, ‘‘did you see your
name’’? We had previously instructed participants to answer
‘‘Yes’’ if they had seen their Fake name and ‘‘No’’ otherwise,
including when they saw their real name (the Probe) (participants’
responses to this question are reported in the supplementary
material: Table S1 in Appendix S1). We chose two further names
unfamiliar to the participant from the subset of twelve possible
names and used them as Irrelevant1 and Irrelevant2. Experimentally,
we treated these identically; their only difference was in the
(random) choice of name. Furthermore, Irrelevants were identical
to distractors apart from the frequency with which they occurred
over the course of the experiment (50 times each and approxi-
mately once per distractor).
2.1.3 Experiments. In total 5 experiments (groups) were
conducted, named as follows:
N No countermeasures (exp. 1)
N Countermeasure: Probe as low salient (exp. 2)
N Countermeasure: Irrelevants as high salient 1 (exp. 3)
N Countermeasure: Irrelevants as high salient 2 (exp. 4)
N Innocents (exp. 5)
The instructions described in the previous section were given to
all participants (including those in the Innocents group). An
additional set of instructions was given to participants assigned to
each of the countermeasure groups (as described in Section 2.1.6
below). The first four experiments were conducted to assess the
detection sensitivity of our method. In other words, their aim was
to measure the hit rate. Similarly to our previous study [22], we
evaluated the false alarm rate by conducting the ‘‘Innocents’’
experiment. Participants assigned to that group were not shown a
Probe (i.e. their own first name). Rather, we replaced the Probe
with an additional Irrelevant (Irrelevant3), which was a name
selected in the same fashion as the other two Irrelevants, and we
assessed the probability of falsely ascribing guilt to the Innocent
(this is discussed more in detail in Section 2.1.13). We estimated
the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve (AUC) for the first four experiments by iterating through all
possible alpha levels (from.0001 to 1). A hit rate (using p-values
obtained in the given hit rate experiment) and a false alarm rate
(based on the p-values obtained in the fifth experiment, the
‘‘Innocents’’) were calculated for each alpha level setting. The
resulting sensitivity and specificity ranges where used to estimate
the AUC for the first four experiments.
2.1.4 Participants. All participants were students or staff at
the University of Kent. All were right handed. Participants were
free from neurological disorders and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Only native English speakers participated in the
experiment. The study was advertised publicly and all were paid 8
pounds (GBP) for participating. Details for each group are as
follows:
N No countermeasures (exp. 1): 12 participants, 5 male, 7 female.
Age range: 21–27 (M: 20.7, SD: 2.4).
N Probe as low salient (exp. 2): 10 participants, 5 male, 5 female.
Age range: 19–23 (M: 19.9, SD: 1.2).
N Irrelevants as high salient 1 (exp. 3): 10 participants, 4 male, 6
female. Age range: 19–33 (M: 21.7, SD: 4.1).
N Irrelevants as high salient 2 (exp. 4): 10 participants, 5 male, 5
female. Age range: 18–29 (M: 21.1, SD: 3.4).
N Innocents (exp. 5): 8 participants, 4 male, 4 female. Age range:
19–20. (M: 18.9, SD: 0.8).
An additional participant took part in the Probe as low salient
experiment, but was excluded from analysis due to a high number
of artefacts (our inclusion threshold was at least 20 valid trials in all
conditions). All participants took part in only one experiment.
2.1.5 Ethics. This study was approved by the University of
Kent Psychology Ethics Committee, which follows the guidelines
set by the British Psychological Society regarding experiments with
human participants. The study was approved as reference number
20101504. Written consent was obtained from all participants.
Figure 1. Example names. List of example names, formatted as
stimuli. Note that name 3 would not be shown immediately after
name 4 as they have 2 letters (‘A’ and ‘L’) in the same position.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g001
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2.1.6 Countermeasures. Participants who were assigned to
one of the countermeasure groups were given an additional set of
instructions. These instructions were based on the type of
countermeasure being applied:
Probe as low salient (exp. 2): participants were told that the
detector works by detecting when they see their real name. In
order to avoid this, they were told to concentrate hard on ‘‘not
seeing their real name’’.
Irrelevants as high salient 1 (exp. 3): participants were told that
two further names appear frequently in the experiment (i.e. the
Irrelevants). They were told that their task was to count the
number of times that each occurs in the experiment.
Irrelevants as high salient 2 (exp. 4): participants were instructed
that two further names (the Irrelevants) appear in the experiment.
In this case, their task was to identify at least one of them and,
once identified, pretend that it was their real name (although they
were still instructed to answer ‘No’ to the ‘Did you see your name?’
question, even after identifying one of the Irrelevants).
Participants were briefed verbally before the start of the
experiments: they were informed of how the deception detector
works prior to the start of EEG recording. They were instructed to
perform only one countermeasure strategy, depending on the
group they were assigned to. In addition to the verbal briefing,
they were given written instructions. The exact written instructions
that were given to participants can be found in the supplementary
material, Appendix S2.
2.1.7 Recording Apparatus. We recorded data using a
Brain Products QuickAmp recorder (BrainProducts, Munich,
Germany). We bandpass filtered data at recording, with a low-
pass of 85 Hz and a high-pass of 0.30 Hz. We recorded
Electroencephalographic data from the Fz, Cz, P3, Pz, P4, A1
and A2 electrodes using the standard 10–20 system (Jasper, 1958).
We recorded electrooculograms from the left and right eyes using
two bipolar HEOG and VEOG electrodes. During recording, we
used the average of all channels as reference (common reference).
We kept impedances below 5 kOhm.
2.1.8 Analysis Procedure. We analysed data with EEGLAB
version 9 under Matlab 2010a [26] and custom scripts which
implemented the methods described in the following sections. At
analysis, we software filtered data with a low-pass of 45 Hz and
high-pass of 0.5 Hz. We applied a notch filter between 8 Hz and
12 Hz to remove ssVEP oscillations set-up by the RSVP stream.
We re-referenced data to the average of the combined mastoids
(electrodes A1 and A2). We detected eye blinks by marking any
activity below –200 mV or above +200 mV in the EOG channels as
artifactual. Additionally, trials were automatically inspected so that
any trial containing electrical activity below –50 mV or above
+50 mV in the remaining EEG channels was rejected. Both these
procedures only considered data ranging from –500ms to 1000ms
from critical item (Probe, Fake, Irrelevant1/2) onset. The number
of trials remaining after artefact rejection, per condition, ranged
between 23 and 50 (M: 46.35, SD: 4.34) across all experiments. We
calculated ERPs, on which the following analysis is based, using –
100ms to 1000ms stimulus-locked windows, baseline corrected
from –100ms to 0ms.
2.1.9 P3 differences. For each condition (Probe, Fake and
Irrelevant2), we estimate three different P3 measures, named P3b-
Pz, P3a-Fz and P3a-Cz. This is done on a participant-by-
participant basis (on participant-level ERPs). These three mea-
surements are determined from the point-wise difference between
the ERP of the given condition and the ERP of the Irrelevant1
condition, which plays the role of baseline. The measure employed
is the peak-to-peak value of the difference wave (condition minus
Irrelevant1). In more detail, initially, the raw difference between
the ERP of the given condition and the ERP of the Irrelevant1
condition is calculated. The result of this operation is a difference
wave, which in certain conditions contains a P3 signal. In order to
determine the intensity of the signal, a peak-to-peak measurement
procedure is applied to this difference wave. Two parameters of
this procedure vary depending upon the channel: P3b parameters
are applied at Pz, P3a parameters at Fz and Cz. The first
parameter is the start of the time window in which we search for the
P3 (strictly, search for its highest and lowest peaks), we call this the
bounding P3 window. For the P3b, the bounding window starts at
300ms from critical item onset and ends at 1000ms from critical
item onset, whereas for the P3a the bounding window starts at
150ms and ends at 1000ms (the search for the positive peak of the
P3a was limited, though, to between 150ms and 300ms from
critical item onset, as detailed in the next section). We consider the
extent and placement of these bounding windows to be a priori
justified by the P3 literature and also directly inherited from [22],
and thus not subject to multiple comparison’s correction [27].
(Note, preserving window placement and analysis parameters
exactly from a previous study is the most certain way to guard
against statistical bias, i.e. inflation of Type I errors, since the
probability that the ‘‘background’’ noise variability in the data has
a similar pattern across the two studies is very small.) As just
discussed, the second parameter that varies between P3b and P3a
analysis is the presence of a boundary that limits the search for the
highest peak, which is present only for the P3a analysis (this is
discussed in more detail in the next section).
2.1.10 Peak-to-Peak. The peak-to-peak procedure we ap-
plied to the difference waves (generated following the procedure
described in the preceding section), determines the disparity
between the highest peak and the following lowest (typically
negative) peak in the specified P3 bounding window. Note that
peaks here are not identified based on single time points, but
rather on averages computed across relatively small windows of
time points. This usage is consistent with peak-to-peak measure-
ments used in previous P3 deception detection research [17]. (For
the purpose of this paper, the word peak will always refer to such
an average). Hence, peaks were identified as the highest or lowest
averages across inner windows of 100ms, i.e. each peak
corresponds to the mean voltage of that window. (We use the
term inner window to refer to a time interval across which we
calculate the average amplitude.) The procedure finds the highest
peak first, by iterating through all 100ms (inner window) intervals
from the start of the P3 bounding window until its end. In other
words, we slide a 100ms interval across the bounding window,
looking for the interval with the highest average. For the P3a, the
search for the highest peak ends at 300ms from critical item onset.
The presence of this boundary prevents the P3b (whose start was
previously pinpointed at 300ms in RSVP experiments [24]) from
being detected as the highest peak of the P3a. Note that the end of
the P3a bounding window coincides with the end of the P3b
bounding window. This is because the variability in the latency of
the P3a negative bounce-back is too high to allow for an
alternative placement. Consequently, we decided to place a broad
window to avoid the risk of over-fitting search windows to our
ERP patterns. This approach is statistically safe, as we demon-
strated in the ‘‘Intrinsic validity test’’ presented in our previous
study [22]. This is because the same broadness of search window is
applied under the null hypothesis, i.e. under our randomisation.
After the highest peak is found, the procedure then continues
iterating from the first non-overlapping position that followed the
highest peak until the end of the P3 bounding window, searching
for the lowest peak. The peak-to-peak measurement is finally
calculated as highest minus lowest.
Countering Countermeasures
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Subtracting, in this way, lowest from highest peak in the P3
bounding window, will, in most cases, yield a positive peak-to-peak
value. Thus, in our group-level P3 analysis, a comparison against
zero is inappropriate, and we require a ‘no-effect’ baseline to
compare against. The inclusion of Irrelevant2 trials gives this
baseline. Thus, we also calculate an Irrelevant2 peak-to-peak by,
in the same way, subtracting out the Irrelevant1 ERP and
calculating an Irrelevant2 peak-to-peak value on the Irrelevant2
minus Irrelevant1 difference wave. We compare the Probe peak-
to-peak values to the Irrelevant2 peak-to-peak values across
participants using a t-test. Raw peak-to-peak data for all
participants are provided in the supplementary material (Table
S2 in Appendix S1).
2.1.11 First Level: Single dimension randomisation. For
each electrode, we undertake a separate first level randomisation;
thus, electrodes Fz, Cz and Pz serve as single dimensions. We then
perform a second level analysis, which determines a combined
significance across these dimensions/electrodes. We discuss these
first level randomisations here.
We applied a randomisation procedure in order to determine a
participant’s null hypothesis distribution. (Note, a trial is effectively
a triple, with P3a-Fz, P3a-Cz and P3b-Pz segments. In this way,
we maintain the correlations across electrodes within trials.) Before
the procedure started, the least number of valid trials between the
Probe and Irrelevant1 conditions was determined (valid trials are
free of eye blinks and other artefacts; Section 2.1.8 detailed our
artefact rejection procedure, including the typical number of trials
rejected in this study); we call this number m. m trials were, then,
selected from the Probe condition, and m from the Irrelevant1
condition. These selections were performed at random, without
replacement.
The randomisation procedure was the same at each electrode
(Pz, Fz, Cz); for each it proceeded as follows. First, two vectors
(each of size m) were randomly populated with the 26m selected
trials. Note, under the null hypothesis, Irrelevant1 and Probe trials
would be samples from the same distribution - the null distribution
- and would thus be exchangeable. Second, a pair of ERPs were
generated, one from each vector. One of these ERPs notionally
playing the Probe role and the other the Irrelevant1 role. A peak-
to-peak difference between the two ERPs was then calculated. The
procedure repeated until 10,000 values were obtained; these
10,000 correspond to the null hypothesis distribution.
Figure 2. Grand average ERPs for the ‘‘No countermeasures’’ experiment (exp. 1), all channels. (Positive plotted down.) Vertical dashed
lines mark the regions in which we search for P3 peaks. The search window for the positive peak of the P3a ends at 300ms, which coincides with the
start of the window for the P3b at Pz (as described in Section 2.1.9, we search for the positive peak of the P3a between 150–300ms at Fz and Cz, while
for the P3b we start at 300ms, at Pz. All bounding windows end at 1000ms from critical item onset). Note the large P3a for the Probe condition, which
is much less pronounced in the Fake condition. Also note the large P3b for the Probe condition (Pz channel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g002
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A p-value was determined as follows: the true observed value
was obtained from the (true) ERPs of the given participant, as the
peak-to-peak of the difference between the (true) Probe and (true)
Irrelevant1 conditions. Since, as previously discussed, we apply
this same procedure at the three electrodes (Pz, Fz, Cz), we obtain
three, Probe against Irrelevant, p-values.
2.1.12 Second Level: Combined analysis. For each
participant, the data from the three single dimension randomisa-
tions (P3a-Fz, P3a-Cz and P3b-Pz) described the previous section
were used to compute a joint p-value under a Fisher combined
probability test. A number of methods for combining different
dimensions of statistical significance have been considered [28,29].
The Fisher method (discussed in Hayasaka and Nichols) treats the
different dimensions consistently, since by combining p-values of
individual dimensions, it automatically normalises into a common
comparable measure. A dimension where there are very large
(raw) differences between data points would have a dispropor-
tionate effect on the combined significance without such normal-
isation.
To determine a combined p-value for one participant across
electrodes (P3a-Cz, P3a-Fz and P3b-Pz), we first calculated 10,000
single dimension p-values, for each electrode. Each such p-value
reflects where one data point (denoted d), arising from our original
random resampling (which was described in Section 2.1.11), sits in
its single dimension randomisation distribution. That is, a p-value
was obtained by determining the proportion of the 10,000 values
present in the single dimension randomisation distribution that
were above d. This gave us 30,000 p-values: 10,000 for each
electrode/dimension, with associations across dimensions, such
that data point i in the P3a-Fz electrode corresponds to point i in
the P3a-Cz electrode and point i in the P3b electrode (since these
three data points were generated from the same random sample).
Finally, 10,000 Fisher scores were obtained by using the following
formula:
WFi ~{2log(P
P3a{Fz
i  PP3a{Czi  PP3bi )
where, i ranges over the 10,000 random samples. The key
aspect of this formula is that the p-values from single dimensions
are multiplied.
Similarly, a Fisher score was calculated on the true observed
data point using the same formula. An overall, cross dimension
p-value was, then, obtained by calculating how many of the 10,000
Figure 3. Grand average ERPs for the ‘‘Probe as low salient’’ experiment (exp. 2), all channels. (Positive plotted down.) Vertical dashed
lines mark the regions in which we search for P3 peaks. Again, the search window for the positive peak of the P3a ends at 300ms, coinciding with the
start of the P3b-Pz window. Note the P3a for the Probe condition is identifiable as a large distance between positive and negative peaks. Also note
the large P3b for the Probe condition (Pz channel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g003
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random sample Fisher scores were above the true observed Fisher
score, and then dividing by 10,000. When calculating Fisher
scores, values of p = 0 (which would result in the formula returning
infinity) were replaced by the smallest legitimate p-value, 0.0001
(1/10,000). Further discussion of our implementation of Fisher’s
combinatorial method, including a sanity check regarding its
‘‘intrinsic’’ false positive rate, can be found in our previously
published paper [22].
It should be noted that there has been debate concerning the
appropriateness of Fisher combining in meta-analyses. Specifically,
it has been argued that the Fisher method incurs a loss of
precision. [30] is a good discussion of these issues. Importantly,
with simulated data, [30] showed that there was no inflation of the
type one error with Fisher combining; that is, when the null
hypothesis is true (i.e. on pure noise data) the probability of
obtaining a significant result is the alpha level. But, there was a loss
of precision when data sets containing an effect were considered.
The Type I error rate, though, is the most fundamental criterion
for judging the validity of a method, i.e. that the false positive rate
is not inflated, and, indeed, as just stated, we provide such a
demonstration in [22], i.e. that in the context of our experiments
on EEG data, there is no type one error inflation.
It is though certainly not optimal that Fisher combining does
not accurately combine probabilities in non-null meta-analysis
data sets. This though is not in fact relevant to our use of the Fisher
method. This is for two reasons. Firstly, Whitlock considers the
Fisher in the context of a Chi-squared test – we do not perform
such a test, rather our permutation procedure is nonparametric
and, thus, does not make any assumptions about distribution
shape. Secondly, and most importantly, we are not performing a
meta-analysis. Whitlock’s demonstration of imprecision is in the
context that the true probability for the tests being combined is the
same – as it would be if each experiment was, at least theoretically,
a replication of the others – this is the meta-analysis case. In
contrast, we are combining p-values from three electrodes – these
are not identical tests. For example, the P3a component seen at Fz
is very different to the P3b at Pz. Thus, Whitlock’s assessment of
precision against a single ‘‘true’’ p-value does not apply and,
indeed, in our context there is no ‘‘ground-truth’’ overall p-value
to assess our Fisher combining against.
In this context, the critical criteria for judging a statistical
method’s validity are, first, the Type I error rate and, second, that
the method has sufficient statistical power to give significant results
when non trivial effects are present. The first of these is justified by
Figure 4. Grand average ERPs for the ‘‘Irrelevant as high salient 1’’ experiment (exp. 3), all channels. (Positive plotted down.) Vertical
dashed lines mark the regions in which we search for P3 peaks. Again, the search window for the positive peak of the P3a ends at 300ms, coinciding
with the start of the P3b-Pz window. Note the large P3a for the Probe condition, identifiable as a large distance between the positive and negative
peaks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g004
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our intrinsic false positive test in [22] and the second, informally,
from our success in [22] in detecting identity deception.
2.1.13 False Positive Rate. In one respect, the randomisa-
tion procedure controls the false positive rate, by explicitly
calculating the null hypothesis distribution and deriving a p-value
from it; that is, by considering the consequence of interpreting the
Probe and Irrelevant as samples from the same distribution.
However, the true empirical false positive rate is the chance of
interpreting a non-deceiving participant as deceiving and that
requires considering a situation in which what the experimenter
considers to be a Probe in fact really is an Irrelevant. Put another
way, our randomisation procedure calculates the false positive rate
when the Probe is hypothetically treated as an irrelevant, but,
because all participants are lying about their identity in our main
experiment, the Probe was in fact indeed their real name. But,
there remains the possibility that participants behave differently if
there really is no condition in which their name is present. For
example, it might be that without a Probe to notice, Irrelevants
would be more easily seen. This is the question we explore in our
empirical false positive rate experiment.
Specifically, we ran our experiment on the ‘‘Innocents’’ group
(experiment 5, as per Section 2.1.4). We utilised exactly the same
stimulus presentation, stimuli, recording apparatus and technique
previously highlighted. The only difference being that there was no
Probe, but rather three Irrelevants: Irrelevant1, Irrelevant2 and
Irrelevant3, each selected at random from the set of possible
names, without informing the participant of their identity. Thus,
their real name did not appear frequently in the experiment (it
could only appear as a distractor: the chance of this happening in
any given trial was 0.38%, i.e. less than half a percent). Handling
of the Fake was unchanged.
This gave us three identical conditions for each participant:
Irrelevant1, Irrelevant2 and Irrelevant3, each of which comprised
three sets of trials - one for each electrode: Fz, Cz and Pz. The
three Irrelevants at each electrode yielded six pairwise compar-
isons, since there are six permutations of three, e.g. (Irrelevant1,
Irrelevant2), (Irrelevant1, Irrelevant3), (Irrelevant2, Irrelevant3),
(Irrelevant2, Irrelevant1), etc. We ran our statistical analysis on
each such pair, with the first in the pair playing the (notional)
Probe role and the second the Irrelevant role. Across the eight
participants, this gave us 48 data sets, each comprising notional
Probe at Fz, Cz and Pz and Irrelevant at Fz, Cz and Pz. We
analysed each data set with single dimension randomisations for
Fz, Cz and Pz and then a Fisher combining. This gave us 48 tests
of an empirically-enforced null hypothesis. From this we can
determine an approximate false positive rate.
2.2 Questionnaires
After the RSVP phase of each experiment, we explored
participants’ memory for presented names, by administering two
questionnaires to every participant. The first was called Recall,
which was followed by a second, called Recognition. In the Recall
test, participants were asked to write five names that they thought
appeared often during the experiment (including the Fake and
Probe). On the Recognition questionnaire we wrote five names
and asked each participant to give their confidence that any of
them appeared. These ratings ranged from 1 (lowest confidence/
name did not appear) to 5 (highest confidence/name appeared
very often). These five names were the Probe, Fake, Irrelevant1,
Irrelevant2 and Noncritical. The Noncritical was selected from the
unfamiliar names in the initial list of 12 names (which was
presented to each participant during prescreening before the start
of the experiment). Unlike the other names present in the
Recognition questionnaire, the Noncritical did not appear often in
the experiment: it could only appear as a distractor. The
probability of the Noncritical appearing in a trial was 0.38%:
the same as any of the possible 3,663 distractor names. Here,
recall, which was deliberately performed first, is the test most
relevant to the feasibility of the Irrelevants as high-salient
countermeasure. In particular, in a deployed deception detector,
suspects would not be cued with the identities of potential
Irrelevants (including the real ones) during lie detection, as they
are in a recognition test.
Recall test results were analysed by computing a contingency
table for each countermeasure strategy. Statistical analysis on the
contingency tables was performed using Fisher’s exact test,
normally used when the number of samples is very small [31].
We took the No countermeasures experiment (exp. 1) as baseline
and in each case assessed whether the particular countermeasure
employed in experiments 2, 3 or 4 changed performance on the
relevant critical item: Probe in exp. 2 and Irrelevant in exps. 3 and
4. Specifically, in the first test, we compared the amount of times
that the Probe was recalled between the No countermeasures
experiment (exp. 1) and the Probe as low salient experiment (exp.
2). This was a left tailed test and indicated the probability that the
Probe was not recalled less often in the Probe as low salient
experiment. The remaining four recall tests compared the amount
of times that Irrelevants were recalled in the No countermeasures
experiment (exp. 1) to the number of times they were recalled in
the Irrelevants as high salient experiments (exps. 3 and 4). The
tests were four since we compare each Irrelevant (1/2) separately,
for each pair of experiments (exp. 1 against exp. 3 and exp. 1
against exp. 4). We performed right tailed comparisons, since we
were interested in assessing an increase of recall in the Irrelevant
conditions, when countermeasures are applied.
We analysed the responses given in the recognition question-
naire using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (also called Mann–Whitney
U ). This test is considered to be appropriate when comparing
ordinal and non normally distributed variables such as those
obtained via our recognition questionnaire [32]. The test
compared the scores given by each participant for the Noncritical
against the scores assigned to each ‘‘Critical’’ item (Fake, Probe,
Table 1. Group level t-test results for all experiments and
channels (Probe against Irrelevant2).
Group Channel Outcome
Confidence
interval (mV)
No C/M P3a-Fz t(11)= 5.57, p= .0002; d = 1.61 3.0884 , 7.1197
(exp. 1) P3a-Cz t(11)= 5.72, p= .0001; d = 1.65 2.9892 , 6.7319
P3b-Pz t(11)= 5.91, p= .0001; d = 1.70 5.9681 , 13.0565
Probe Low P3a-Fz t(9)= 6.07, p= .0002; d = 1.92 2.7534 , 6.0243
(exp. 2) P3a-Cz t(9)= 4.83, p= .0009; d = 1.53 2.5583 , 7.0705
P3b-Pz t(9)= 4.06, p= .0029; d = 1.28 2.5068 , 8.8257
Irr High 1 P3a-Fz t(9)= 5.82, p= .0003; d = 1.84 2.5129 , 5.7096
(exp. 3) P3a-Cz t(9)= 3.74, p= .0046; d = 1.18 * 1.2428 , 5.0401
P3b-Pz t(9)= 4.85, p= .0009; d = 1.53 2.6689 , 7.3424
Irr High 2 P3a-Fz t(9)= 5.51, p= .0004; d = 1.74 2.2431 , 5.3690
(exp. 4) P3a-Cz t(9)= 6.16, p= .0002; d = 1.95 1.9261 , 4.1609
P3b-Pz t(9)= 4.85, p= .0009; d = 1.53 1.9618 , 5.3868
* By applying Bonferroni correction for 12 comparisons, we obtain a
significance threshold of p= .0042. This results in one (marginal) failure to find a
significant difference between Probe and Irrelevant2 on single channel data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t001
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Irrelevant1 and Irrelevant2). Here, responses to the Noncritical
serve as baseline, that is, reflect the bias in confidence responses,
i.e. to an item not appearing frequently in the experiment. The test
Figure 5. Grand average ERPs for the ‘‘Irrelevant as high salient 2’’ experiment (exp. 4), all channels. (Positive plotted down.) Vertical
dashed lines mark the regions in which we search for the P3. Again, the search window for the positive peak of the P3a ends at 300ms, coinciding
with the start of the P3b-Pz window. The Probe shows both a P3a and a P3b (Pz channel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g005
Table 2. Wilcoxon rank sum test on the number of times that
‘‘Yes’’ was answered to the ‘‘Did you see your name?’’
question, between the No countermeasures experiment
(exp. 1) and all other experiments.
Experiment Fake Probe Irrelevant1 Irrelevant2
Probe Low (exp. 2) 0.7639 0.6259 0.0366 0.3531
Irr High 1 (exp. 3) 0.0834 0.6331 0.0428 0.0333
Irr High 2 (exp. 4) 0.6667 0.7836 0.3189 0.0464
Innocents (exp. 5) 0.8461 0.9040 0.0005* 0.0294
* Significant results after Bonferroni correction (16 comparisons) are shown in
bold.
Note. The performed test was a two-tailed test. This table shows that, in general,
participants were answering ‘‘Yes’’ to the ‘‘Did you see your name?’’ question
similarly between the No Countermeasure experiment and the other
experiments in most cases. Only one significant result is present for the
Irrelevant1 condition in the Innocent experiment. This is due to a few
participants misinterpreting the instructions in the No Countermeasure
condition, who answered ‘‘Yes’’ in trials in which they did not see their real
name (the Probe), including Irrelevant trials. This is detailed in the
supplementary material (Table S1 in Appendix S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t002
Table 3. Wilcoxon rank sum test on the number of times that
‘‘Yes’’ was answered to the ‘‘Did you see your name?’’
question, comparing between the Fake and the other
conditions/experiments.
Experiment Probe Irrelevant1 Irrelevant2
No Countermeasures (exp. 1) ,0.0001 0.0004 0.0002
Probe Low (exp. 2) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Irr High 1 (exp. 3) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Irr High 2 (exp. 4) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
Innocents (exp. 5) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note. Right tailed test, all significant, showing that participants were following
instructions correctly, answering "Yes" more often after Fake trials in all
experiments (Bonferroni correction for 15 comparisons puts the significance
threshold at p = 0.0033). When aggregating across all experiments, we get
p,.0001 for all conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t003
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was left tailed (i.e. the alternative hypothesis was that the
Noncriticals obtained smaller scores than the Criticals). A test
was performed for each experiment. The results of these analyses
are reported in Section 3.2.3.
Results
3.1 Group-Level Analysis
There are, in fact, two ERP components that in all four of our
experiments, enable us to distinguish Probe from Irrelevant: a
fronto-central complex, which we interpret as a P3a, and a parietal
complex, which we interpret as a P3b. Our first experiment
demonstrated clearly distinct group-level (Fz, Cz & Pz) grand
average ERP profiles for Probes compared to Irrelevants in a
basic, no-countermeasures, condition, see Figure 2. The size of this
effect was reflected in a highly significant group-level difference
between Probe and Irrelevant (P3a-Fz: t(11) = 5.57, p,.0002;
d = 1.61. P3a-Cz: t(11) = 5.72, p,.0001; d = 1.65. P3b-Pz: t(11)
= 5.91, p = .0001; d = 1.70).
In the second experiment, we specifically tested the Probes as
low-salient countermeasure. The procedure was unchanged from
experiment 1, apart from extra pre-experiment instructions.
Specifically, we told participants how the identity detector worked,
i.e. that it detects the brain state generated when one’s own name
is seen, and to concentrate hard on ‘‘not seeing their real name’’.
This Probe as low-salient countermeasure failed to remove our
ERP effect. Specifically, group-level grand average ERPs, see
Figure 3, again exhibited clear and highly significant differences
between Probe and Irrelevant (P3a-Fz: t(9) = 6.07, p,.0002; d =
1.92. P3a-Cz: t(9) = 4.83, p = .0009; d = 1.53. P3b-Pz: t(9) =
4.06, p = .0029; d = 1.28).
In the third experiment, we tested the Irrelevants as high-salient
countermeasure. The procedure was, again, unchanged from
experiment 1, apart from added pre-experiment instructions.
Specifically, we told participants that two unidentified names (i.e.
the Irrelevants) would occur frequently, to attempt to ‘see’ these
names on the basis of their frequent presentation and accordingly,
to count how often each occurred. The group-level (grand
average) ERPs arising from this manipulation, see Figure 4, again
exhibited a clear difference between Probe and Irrelevant, which
remained significant (P3a-Fz: t(9) = 5.82, p = .0003; d = 1.84.
P3a-Cz: t(9) = 3.74, p = .0046; d = 1.18. P3b-Pz: t(9) = 4.85,
p = .0009; d = 1.53).
Experiment three leaves the possibility that Irrelevants might
not have generated a P3-pattern similar to the Probe, because the
task performed to the Irrelevant (when seen) induced a task set
different to that applied to Probe or, indeed, Fake. Thus,
experiment four was identical to experiment three, apart from
Figure 6. Grand average ERPs for the Innocents (exp. 5). (Positive plotted down.) Note the absence of P3a (Fz and Cz) and P3b (Pz) for all
conditions but the Fake.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g006
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an instruction change. This required that, once ‘seen’, rather than
counting occurrences of Irrelevants, participants would ‘pretend’ it
was their real name. In this way, they would treat Irrelevants as
similarly as possible to how they treat Probes (they cannot, of
course, treat them identically, since they are not their true name).
As anticipated, the instruction change did not substantially alter
the ERP pattern. Consequently, group-level grand average ERPs,
see Figure 5, again showed a clear difference between Probe and
Irrelevant, which remained highly significant (P3a-Fz: t(9) = 5.51,
p = .0004; d = 1.74. P3a-Cz: t(9) = 6.16, p = .0002; d = 1.95.
P3b-Pz: t(9) = 4.85, p = .0009; d = 1.53). All t-test results are
aggregated in Table 1, where we also consider Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons.
In addition, participants were behaving as instructed, since they
responded ‘‘yes’’ to the (end of stream) ‘‘Did you see your name?’’
question very often for Fake and very infrequently for both Probe
and Irrelevants. We verified this pattern using a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, comparing the number of ‘‘yes’’ responses between
conditions and experiments (see Tables 2 and 3 for details).
3.1.1 Early fronto-central complex. Now, considering all
experiments, we observe a clear fronto-central full oscillation cycle,
which is large and early for the Probe, medium-sized and slightly
later for the Fake and absent for Irrelevant1 and Irrelevant2, as
shown in the grand averages for Fz and Cz (Figures 2–5). This
component is initially positive, with a following damped negative
deflection. As in our previous work [22], we call this a P3a (we
return to the reasoning behind this naming in the discussion,
Section 4.2). Our key group-level P3a statistical test is a paired t-
test of a peak-to-peak analysis of Probe P3a and Irrelevant2 P3a
across participants. We performed a test for each experiment. The
outcome of these tests are reported in Table 1, along with results
for the Cz and Pz channels (the individual peak-to-peak values on
which the t-tests were computed are provided in the supplemen-
tary material: Table S2 in Appendix S1). All paired t-tests were
highly significant, except for one marginally significant outcome
(after Bonferroni correction).
3.1.2 P3b component. Figures 2–5 present grand averages
for all experiments. In the Pz channels, positive deflections in the
identified P3b region are clearly evident for Fake and Probe. The
P3b elicited by the Fake often (but not always) has the largest
amplitude. The Probe also generates a robust group-level P3b,
which is somewhat smaller and earlier than the Fake P3b. As for
the P3a analysis, peak-to-peak P3b values for both Probe and
Irrelevant2 were compared and are provided in Table S2 in
Appendix S1. Results of all t-tests of Probe against Irrelevant,
which resulted in very significant differences between the two
conditions, are summarised in Table 1. As expected, the only P3b
pattern that arises from the Innocents grand average was obtained
from Fake trials (Figure 6).
3.2 Analysis by Individual
While a strong group-level effect is indicative, the true test of a
deception detector is at the individual-level; that is, individuals
need to be demonstrated to be deceiving. Accordingly, using a
Monte Carlo permutation test, see Section 2.1.11 for details, we
were able to show that, out of the 12 participants in experiment
one (No countermeasures), 10 differentially processed the Probe on
the P3a-Fz channel, 9 on P3a-Cz and 11 on the P3b-Pz (see Table
S3 in Appendix S1 for p-values calculated on individual electrodes
for all participants on all experiments). Furthermore, using Fisher
combining to aggregate across the three P3 measures, all 12
participants had a Probe pattern distinct from Irrelevant, see
Table 4. The AUC for this experiment was 0.9983. These findings
demonstrate the base effectiveness of the Fringe/P3-Rapid method
when no countermeasures are applied.
Per-individual analyses in the second experiment (Probe as low
salient) were again effective, with Probe significantly different to
Irrelevants for 8/10 participants at Fz, 9/10 at Cz and 6/10 at Pz,
and 8/10 distinguished under (Fisher) combined analysis, with the
two misses being only marginal, see Table 4. Thus, we found no
evidence that volitional control can direct subliminal search ‘not to
see’ a highly salient stimulus sufficiently to confound our deception
detector. The resulting AUC was 0.9854.
Irrelevant as high salient 1, the third experiment, demonstrated
a strong effect at the individual level, with Probe significantly
different to Irrelevant for 8/10 participants at Fz, 8/10 at Cz and
8/10 at Pz, and 9/10 under (Fisher) combined analysis, see Table
4. For this method, we calculated an AUC of 0.95. Thus, the effect
of interest was not reduced sufficiently to suggest volitional control
is able to direct the subliminal search system to ‘see’ Irrelevants
effectively enough to confound our ERP analysis.
Analysis of the fourth experiment was, once again, effective,
with Probe significantly different to Irrelevant for 6/10 partici-
pants at Fz, 9/10 at Cz and 8/10 at Pz. Most importantly, 10/10
participants were distinguished under (Fisher) combined analysis,
see Table 4. The resulting AUC was 0.9938. Thus, the findings
here and in experiment three are similar, suggesting that volitional
control is not able to direct subliminal search to unknown frequent
names sufficiently to modulate the ERP signatures that underlie
our case.
The consistency and robustness of our effects across participants
can be seen in the Probe - Irrelevant1 difference waves, on which
participant (observed) peak-to-peak values are computed. These
are shown in Figure 7 (No countermeasures), Figure 8 (Probe as
low salient), Figure 9 (Irrelevant as high salient 1) and Figure 10
(Irrelevant as high salient 2) with P3 bounding regions marked by
dashed vertical lines. For most participants, a full-oscillation cycle
Table 4. Result summary table from per-individual combined
(i.e. across three dimensions) randomisation analysis, all
experiments.
Outcome (p-values)
No C/M Probe Low Irr High 1 Irr High 2
(exp. 1) (exp. 2) (exp. 3) (exp. 4)
0.0008 ,0.0001 0.0302 0.0057
,0.0001 ,0.0001 0.4919* 0.0007
,0.0001 0.0761* 0.0001 ,0.0001
0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0048
,0.0001 0.0560* 0.0006 0.0002
0.0009 ,0.0001 ,0.0001 ,0.0001
,0.0001 0.0017 ,0.0001 0.0037
,0.0001 0.0324 ,0.0001 0.0181
0.0049 0.0001 0.0005 0.0397
0.0006 ,0.0001 ,0.0001 0.0070
0.0001
0.0243
* Participants whose p-value was above 0.05 are indicated with an asterisk (and
in bold if p . 0.1). Three misses out of 42 are present, two of which are
marginal. This is an extremely small Type II error rate. Note that rows are not
meant to identify specific participants (this would imply that most took part in
all experiments). For example, row 4 in this table would involve four
participants, each of which was the fourth participant in an experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t004
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can be seen at Fz, while a large peak-to-peak oscillation can be
seen at Pz. The relative size of positive deflection to following
negative deflection varies by participant, but a peak-to-peak
difference is clear for all apart from a couple of participants.
3.2.1 Fisher combined analysis. Considering all experi-
ments, Table 4 shows the p-values obtained for each participant in
combined 3-dimensional inference, using Fisher scoring. For many
participants (15 out of 42), the p-value was smaller than 0.0001;
that is, when the three dimensions (P3-Fz, P3-Cz and P3b) were
weighed together, there were no null hypothesis data points above
the true observed value, clearly indicating presence of those
participants’ real name. Twenty-eight have p-values less than or
equal to 0.001, and eleven have relatively greater p-values, but still
below a 0.05 alpha level, again successfully detecting ‘‘own-name’’
occurrence. The p-value for three participants was above the 0.05
alpha level, two of which were below 0.1 (which is often used as the
significance threshold in EEG deception detection [8,9,14]), while
only one was above the 0.1 threshold.
3.2.2 False positive rate. As previously discussed, we are
also interested in the false positive (i.e. Type I error) rate of our
overall deception detection approach, over and above the intrinsic
false positive rate of our statistical inference method (which was
confirmed, as required, to be the alpha level in [22]). This was
explored in our Innocents condition (experiment 5). Each of the
eight participants saw three Irrelevants, any one of these
Irrelevants could play the role of the Probe in our analysis, or,
indeed, either of the two Irrelevant roles. Accordingly, to generate
a larger number of data points, we analysed 48 data sets, which
comprise all the possible allocations of the three Irrelevants to roles
(for each participant, there are six allocations of three Irrelevants
to roles, since there are six permutations of three items;
furthermore, there are eight participants and 668= 48). Out of
the 48 null data sets analysed, two yielded significant p-values, see
Table 5, which gives no evidence for inflation of the false positive
rate, over and above the alpha level. The p-values reported in
Table 5 were also used to calculate specificity for the AUC
estimates previously reported in Section 3.2.
3.2.3 Questionnaires. We used Fisher’s exact test to
compare the amount of Probe recalls between the No counter-
measures and Probe as low salient experiments (as described in
Section 2.2) and we did not find any evidence that Probe was
recalled less frequently in the countermeasure experiment (p=1,
left tailed). With respect to the Irrelevant as low salient
experiments, the right tailed tests between the No counter-
measures and Irrelevant as high salient 1 experiments failed to find
any significant increase in the amount of recalls for either
Irrelevant1 (p= .1053) or Irrelevant2 (p= .4286). Similarly, no
significant difference was found in the comparison between the No
countermeasures and Irrelevant as high salient 2 experiments
(p= .4286, for both Irrelevant1 and Irrelevant2). A limited number
of participants did recall one or two Irrelevants in the Irrelevant as
high salient 1 experiment, although this effect was not systematic
Figure 7. Difference waves for the ‘‘No countermeasures’’ experiment (exp. 1), all channels and participants. (Positive plotted down.)
Probe - Irrelevant1 ERP difference waves, for each participant, are shown in this figure. Dashed vertical lines mark the start and end of P3 bounding
windows: 150–300ms for P3a positive peak and 300–1000ms for P3b. Clear oscillations can be seen, suggesting that Probe stimuli were clearly
perceived by participants, unlike Irrelevant1 stimuli.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g007
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enough to produce a statistically significant difference. However, a
comparison between the Irrelevant as high salient 1 experiment
against an hypothetical experiment in which no Irrelevant recalls
were reported would produce a significant result. Additional raw
behavioural data collected via the recall questionnaires is provided
in Tables S4-S9 in Appendix S1).
Wilcoxon rank-sum test results obtained by comparing the
scores given by participants to the Noncritical name against the
Critical names are presented in Table 6. The only significant
differences found are between the Noncritical and Probe/Fake,
providing no evidence that participants, in general, assigned
higher scores to the Irrelevants. Some participants did, though,
assign higher raw confidence scores to the Irrelevants than the
Noncritical, although, as just indicated, this effect was not
statistically reliable at the group level. Participants’ individual
responses are listed in the supplementary material (Tables S10-S11
in Appendix S1).
Discussion
4.1 Irrelevant as high salient experiments
There are a number of points to consider with regard to the
Irrelevants as high salient countermeasure. In particular, we did
see a change in the Irrelevant ERP and recall/recognition of
Irrelevants in experiments three and four, when participants were
attempting the Irrelevants as high salient countermeasure.
However, this change in the electrophysiological and behavioural
pattern was not sufficient to confound the Fringe/P3-Rapid
method. Furthermore, the Irrelevants’ P3 pattern remained very
different to, even, the Fake pattern. This is important, since a likely
consequence of artificially elevating the salience of an Irrelevant is
to make it a task-prescribed target, in much the same way as the
Fake.
Thus, it would seem that, when participants ‘‘see’’ the
Irrelevant, it is sufficiently late in the experiment that any P3
present in those (late) trials is ‘‘watered down’’ when averaged
against the earlier P3-absent trials. Note, such late detection of
Irrelevants would lead to an increase in recall and recognition of
these Irrelevants (which we see in a limited number of cases); after
all, our memory tests do take place after all trials have completed.
But, such an increase in memory could only reflect very late
identification of the Irrelevant.
This, then, certainly supports the statement that ‘‘it is hard to
direct the subliminal search system to detect frequently presented
unknown stimuli’’. However, it does not necessarily contradict the
stronger statement that, ‘‘it is not possible to direct the subliminal
search system to detect frequently presented unknown stimuli’’.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in our experiments, the
Irrelevants were selected from a list presented to participants prior
to the experimental blocks. This was done to ensure that neither
Figure 8. Difference waves for the ‘‘Probe as low salient’’ experiment (exp. 2), all channels and participants. (Positive plotted down.)
Like Figure 7, this figure displays Probe - Irrelevant1 difference waves, in this case for the ‘‘Probe as low salient’’ experiment. This figure does not differ
much from Figure 7, as strong P3 responses were elicited in most cases. Dashed vertical lines mark the start and end of P3 bounding windows:
150–300ms for P3a positive peak and 300–1000ms for P3b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g008
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Irrelevant was a priori familiar to the participant; all names
marked by the participant as familiar on the pre-experiment list
were excluded from the experiment.
Presentation of this pre-experiment list is likely to prime the
items included, two of which were the Irrelevants. This may well
make it easier for participants to detect the Irrelevants than it
might be if they had not been primed and were, thus, completely
novel (and, indeed, in a deployed identity detector, one could not
perform this pre-experiment screening of items and would, rather,
rely on the low probability that an Irrelevant chosen from a list of
3665 names would be highly familiar).
In this sense, our experiment is a rather generous test of the
ability to detect stimuli solely on the basis of their frequency (in the
sense that detecting stimuli in the memory tests here does not
ensure their detectability in a deployed system). Narrower (stricter)
tests of this question await further empirical study. It is also, in this
respect, in fact a conservative test of our ERP detection method,
with regard to the Irrelevants as High Salient countermeasure.
Thus, the success of our method at differentiating Probe from
Irrelevant ERPs during this countermeasure is very promising.
Secondly, it would certainly seem likely that some RSVP items
could be perceived, under what, according to current scientific
understanding, would have to be attributed to chance. For
example, it could be that, effectively by accident, a name will
sometimes occur surrounded by temporally adjacent names that
are poor masks for its visual form. As a result, this name may
‘‘pop-out’’ of the stream and be perceived.
The frequency of occurrence of Irrelevants makes them
singularly likely to be perceived in this way. Thus, it may be that
Irrelevants become ‘‘known’’ to participants through ‘‘chance pop-
out’’. However, the critical difference in the experiment three and
four countermeasures cases is that participants are ‘‘looking out’’
for unknown repeating items and, as a result, they recall them
more strongly.
Thus, the nature of the perception of Irrelevants really remains
an empirical question and it is still possible that direction towards
detection of unknown frequent stimuli is, indeed, strictly
impossible in subliminal search. However, empirically differentiat-
ing between an interpretation based on (at least initially) chance
pop-out of Irrelevants or active subliminal search on the basis of
their frequency is certainly challenging and, may, in the end,
amount to philosophical hair splitting. But, whichever way, in an
absolute sense, Irrelevants are being identified, this does not seem
to occur quickly enough to provide a workable countermeasure in
our RSVP experiments. This is the central point — even when
Irrelevants as High Salient countermeasures are performed, we are
sill able to robustly distinguish the ERP signature for Probes from
that for Irrelevants.
Figure 9. Difference waves for the ‘‘Irrelevant as high salient 1’’ experiment (exp. 3), all channels and participants. (Positive plotted
down.) Similarly to Figures 7 and 8, this figure displays Probe - Irrelevant1 difference waves, in this case for the ‘‘Irrelevant as high salient 1’’
experiment. This figure does not differ much from Figure 7, as strong P3 responses were elicited in most cases. Dashed vertical lines mark the start
and end of P3 bounding windows: 150–300ms for P3a positive peak and 300–1000ms for P3b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g009
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4.2 Novelty of Our Approach
This is the first study demonstrating that presenting stimuli on
the fringe of awareness impairs perception of non-salient items,
hindering countermeasure use. Our approach differs from a
related proposal by Lui and Rosenfeld, whose data supported the
hypothesis that lie-related stimuli, which are presented sublimin-
ally, may differentially affect ERP patterns of subsequent,
Figure 10. Difference waves for the ‘‘Irrelevant as high salient 2’’ experiment (exp. 4), all channels and participants. (Positive plotted
down.) Similarly to Figures 7–9, Probe - Irrelevant1 difference waves for each participant are shown in this figure. Again, we obtained strong P3
responses in most cases, suggesting that this countermeasure strategy did not confound our deception detector. Bounding windows (discussed in
Section 2.1.9) are marked by dashed vertical lines (150–300ms for P3a positive peak and 300–1000ms for P3b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.g010
Table 5. Summary table for the empirical false alarm testing
procedure applied to the Innocents.
Permutation no. (p-values)
Part. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.1890 0.6126 0.9795 0.3762 0.8581 0.2679
2 0.5540 0.1789 0.3742 0.3098 0.5384 0.9463
3 0.5916 0.2056 0.3043 0.1039 0.4743 0.4171
4 0.0337* 0.0753 0.4957 0.7720 0.6576 0.5883
5 0.7921 0.6931 0.6112 0.7730 0.5080 0.4925
6 0.3838 0.1475 0.0600 0.1064 0.2395 0.8784
7 0.0832 0.3243 0.8332 0.8717 0.0884 0.0094*
8 0.6265 0.6605 0.8653 0.9486 0.3942 0.5487
* The outcomes that were significant at an alpha level of p,0.05 are indicated
with an asterisk (and in bold if p,0.1). Two false alarms are present using an
alpha level of 0.05 and six using an alpha level of 0.1, respectively
corresponding to false alarm rates of 4.17% and 12.5%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t005
Table 6. Wilcoxon rank sum test results between the
responses for the ‘‘Noncritical’’ name in the recognition
questionnaires and each ‘‘Critical’’ name.
Experiment Probe Fake Irrelevant1 Irrelevant2
No Countermeasures 0.0002* 0.0006* 0.3869 0.3802
Probe Low 0.0006* 0.0015* 0.3469 0.6860
Irr High 1 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0088 0.0953
Irr High 2 0.0002* 0.0025* 0.3159 0.3447
Innocents 0.2642 0.0170 0.2129 0.0818
* The outcomes that were significant at an alpha level of p # 0.0025 are
indicated with an asterisk (and in bold if p,0.0025).
Note. This was a left tailed test, i.e. the alternative hypothesis was that the
noncritical name scored lower than the given ‘‘critical’’ name. The significance
threshold was set to 0.0025 after applying Bonferroni correction for 20
comparisons. Note that in the Innocents, the Fake was not found significant;
this is most likely due to the low number of participants present in that
experiment (8).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090595.t006
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supraliminal stimuli [18]. In contrast, our hypothesis requires
presentation of stimuli at near-subliminal speeds (on the fringe of
awareness), allowing perception of salient stimuli, including items
which carry concealed knowledge. Specifically, the ERP compar-
ison we are making is between a conscious percept (when the
Probe ‘‘breaks through’’ into awareness), and the absence of such a
conscious experience (as arises for Irrelevants). The large ERP
differences we observe between Probe and Irrelevant seem to
reflect this—presence vs. absence of a conscious experience.
Electrophysiological responses formed in subliminal priming
experiments do not reflect this distinction—the objective in
subliminal priming experiments is to render all primes sublim-
inal—whether salient (as a Probe is) or non-salient (as an Irrelevant
is). Thus, subliminal priming experiments do not induce distinct
conscious versus non-conscious states of experience between
different classes of prime. Really, the effectiveness of the Fringe/
P3-Rapid deception detector rests upon the perceptual regime in
which RSVP places the brain; that is, stimuli are presented such
that only a small subset of them can be consciously perceived, and,
critically, the brain selects those to perceive on the basis of their
salience. In other words, only salient stimuli break into conscious-
ness and set-up the pronounced electrical response we see in the
P3a and P3b.
This study demonstrated high accuracies in the classification of
deceivers and non-deceivers based on ERP data alone, even when
countermeasures were applied. Previous studies have indeed
demonstrated that one’s own name, one of the most over-
rehearsed stimuli, can elicit large electrophysiological responses,
particularly in frontal regions [33]. The P3a (or novelty P3) was
also elicited in comatose patients, by using their own name (as an
auditory stimulus) [34]. More generally, the P3a is often elicited
when a participant’s own name is presented as a task-irrelevant
stimulus [35,36]. Because of these precedents, we have used the
term P3a to identify the early fronto-central oscillations we
obtained, although we acknowledge that our P3a patterns differ
somewhat from those typical of oddball-type experiments (which
are characterised by a slightly later latency and rapid habituation
[37]).
The use of first names as stimuli may explain the very high hit
rates we obtained, thanks to the strength of our P3a component.
Nevertheless, the P3b pattern should be reliable across stimulus
types and even if our approach were to show its largest effects in
identity deception, it would still be of interest: countermeasure-
resistant identity deception is a valuable tool for forensic science
(including detection of simulated amnesia). Moreover, P3-based
deception detection systems based on the classical oddball
paradigm have recently been demonstrated to be vulnerable to
countermeasures derived from directed forgetting techniques [38].
The efficacy of such techniques applied to our paradigm remains
to be verified.
While confirmation of the full generality of our findings awaits
further empirical work, our proposal that the Fringe/P3-Rapid
method counters key deception detection countermeasures is
supported by the experiments presented here. We argue that our
apparent success in subverting countermeasures arises from two
key properties of subliminal search.
1. The Probes as low salient countermeasure is countered, since,
one cannot direct the search system not to ‘‘look’’ for a
stimulus whose identity is intrinsically salient to the individual.
2. The Irrelevants as high salient countermeasure is countered,
since volition is impaired in its ability to direct the subliminal
search system to ‘‘look’’ for a stimulus without having already
(perhaps through task instruction) ascribed salience to its
identity.
This leaves us with the summarising adage that during
subliminal search, one cannot withdraw salience from the known
or impose it upon the not known.
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